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Abstract 
This article discusses the problems asso- 
ciated with indicator analysis for the 
purpose of early warning. While the 
authors endorse the idea ofquantitative 
EWM, they are sceptical of the under- 
standing that many have of what EW 
analysis entails. In this article, they 
identify the limits of quantitative EW 
analysis and address many ofthe major 
problems that confront those who are 
committed to quantitative EW analy- 
sis. In particular, the authors discuss 
the following issues that need to be ad- 
dressed when engaging in quantitative 
early warning analysis: the problem of 
"late warning;" problems o f  contextual 
sensitivity; problems of temporal devel- 
opment; data availability and measure- 
ment; and problems with the definition 
of the appropriate unit of analysis. 
Cet article traite des problhes ratta- 
chis h l'utilisation d'indicateurs en 
mat2red'alerteprhentive. Tout en fai- 
sant ttat de la pertinence de l'tlabora- 
tion de mod2le quantitatifi, les auteurs 
h t t e n t  des doutes h propos des con- 
clusions obtenues h partir de ces analy- 
ses. Les limites de ces mod2les et les 
principaux obstacles rencontrts dans la 
conduite de ces analyses sont identifits. 
Les prob lhs  rattachis h unealerte lan- 
cte en retard, au caractbe holutif des 
situations conflictuelles, h la disponibi- 
litt et a l'hluationde l'information, h 
la d@nition et au choix de la dthode 
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d 'analyse appr@e ainsi qu'a l'article 
et h la susceptibilitt des parties impli- 
qudes sont hoquds de manike particu- 
like. 
Early Warning Models (EWMs) have 
largely been used with success in the 
forecasting of ecological disasters such 
as droughts or storms but are as yet 
unproven in the forecasting of hu- 
manitarian disasters such as refugee 
migrations, human rights violations, 
and conflict. Recently, a number of 
scholars have begun systematic work 
on the development of quantitative 
EWMs so that eventually we will be 
able to foreshadow humanitarian dis- 
asters and thereby inform both policy- 
makers and the academic community 
of the risks of such events. For exam- 
ple, there are EWMs of communal con- 
flicts (Gurr 1994), genocides (Fein 
1993), politicides (Harff 1994), armed 
conflicts (Bond and Vogele 1995) and 
population movements (Clark 1983, 
1989). Each of these EWMs suggests 
that eventually we will be able to deal 
with humanitarian disasters in a fash- 
ion similar to ecological ones. Once 
early warning signs are identified, 
such information can be "received, di- 
gested and brought into decision-mak- 
ing by those who can prevent a 
man-made disaster or cope with its 
results" (Gordenker 1986,185). 
While we endorse the idea of quan- 
titative EWM, we are skeptical of the 
understanding that many have of what 
EW analysis entails. In this paper, we 
identify the limits of quantitative EW 
analysis and address many of the ma- 
jor problems that confront those who 
are as committed as we are to quantita- 
tive EW analysis. 
Our main point can be best demon- 
strated through a comparison with 
ecological EWMs. Humanitarian EW 
analysis is inherently reactive. With 
ecological EWMs, once we h o w  that a 
storm, flood or famine will occur, we 
can only prepare to lessen its conse- 
quences by properly sheltering or 
evacuating people and providing re- 
lief. In the case of humanitarian disas- 
ters, however, we have two options: 
We can try to provide relief, or, 
optimally, we can try to prevent the 
disaster from occurring. Since human 
disasters have an intrinsic element of 
human agency, it is always possible to 
negotiate or apply pressure for peace- 
ful (re)solutions. This, of course, makes 
humanitarian EWMs all the more ap- 
pealing since they might allow for the 
possibility of preventive intervention. 
Yet, this very aspect of human agency 
also makes the early warning of hu- 
manitarian disasters much more un- 
predictable than the early warning of 
ecological disasters. In fact, we would 
argue that this makes the goals of hu- 
manitarian EWMs qualitatively differ- 
ent. Instead of attempting to develop 
predictive models, our primary aim 
should be to foreshadow humanitar- 
ian disasters and subsequently inform 
human actors about potential sources 
of humanitarian disaster. Because of 
this inherent reactivity of human ac- 
tion, the major aim of early warning is 
preventive, rather than being strictly a 
forecasting device. As such, humani- 
tarian early warning requires a de- 
tailed analysis of three important 
elements: actors, situations, and con- 
texts. Although we do not believe that 
EWMs will ever to be able to predict 
the exact timing of the outbreak of a 
humanitarian disaster, we do believe 
that they could eventually foreshadow 
such events and thereby alert the poli- 
cyrnakers and the international com- 
munity to conditions in countries 
which are likely to lead to a crisis. 
Therefore, the main issue is not to pre- 
dict exactly when and where a hu- 
manitarian disaster will occur, but to 
learn as much as possible about the 
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underlying patterns of such crises in 
the past (which includes quantitative 
analysis) and integrate such informa- 
tion into a context rich study of a spe- 
cific region in crisis, which, in turn, 
shouldbe derived from extensive case- 
based knowledge. Such knowledge 
can then be used by policymakers to 
develop scenarios and strategic 
alternative responses to prevent, or 
inhibit, the escalation of the factors 
most likely to cause conflict and refu- 
gee migration. 
In the past, then, early warning has 
been interpreted as necessitating a 
model that adequately predicts hu- 
manitarian disasters. As social scien- 
tists, we agree with this goal for 
scientific purposes. However, for 
EWM purposes, this is potentially mis- 
leading. It is important to understand 
the limits of EWMs with the respect to 
humanitarian disasters at the outset 
and to address problems of indicator 
construction within that context. 
Past EWM Research 
Currently, there are numerous efforts 
by academics and policymakers to de- 
velop early warning on quantitative 
basis. As previously mentioned, in the 
past such academic efforts have largely 
and the UN Department of Humani- 
tarian Affairs @HA). Although par- 
tially engaging in case studies, these 
works essentially attempt to construct 
valid indicators that can be used with 
large samples of countries and regions 
to predict specific types of humanitar- 
ian disasters. However, we think such 
work (including our own) has to ad- 
dress a number of problems: 
1. the problem of "late warning" 
2. problems of contextual sensitivity 
3. problems of temporal development 
4. data availability and measurement, 
and 
5. problems with the definition of the 
appropriate unit of analysis. 
The Problem of "Late Warning" 
"Late warning" is a major problem, 
particularly for academic researchers, 
due to a reliance on indicators that are 
collected from official documents (in- 
cluding event data derived from elec- 
tronic newswires), or indicators that 
lag one or more years behind the oc- 
currence of relevant events. This time 
lag impairs a timely analysis and leads 
to a "late warning": an analysis that 
shows whether or not we could have 
predicted a certain event or pattern of 
such events. While "late warning" (or 
- 
Instead of attempting to develop predictive models, our 
primary aim should be to foreshadow humanitarian disasters 
and subsequently inform human actors about potential sources 
of humanitarian disaster. 
relied on a formal model approach, in 
search of the best indicators. Notable 
efforts include the monitoring of major 
armed conflicts (Singer 1994; Wallen- 
steen and Sollenberg 1995; Bond and 
Vogele 1995), ethnic conflict (Gurr 
1993), genocide (Fein 1993), politicide 
(Harff 1994), refugee migrations 
(Scluneidl1995), environmental disas- 
ters (Homer-Dixon 1994; Lee 1994), 
and human rights (Jongman 1994). 
Among policymakers, the most promi- 
nent recent examples are the State Fail- 
ure Project (Gurr 1995), sponsored by 
the United States government, and the 
efforts by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
in scientific terms, retrodiction) is a 
very useful exercise in testing certain 
indicators, it does not really fit the aim 
of EWM, that is early warning. The 
computerization of information and 
the ability to code from computer gen- 
erated news has improved this consid- 
erably, and we suspect that in real time 
forecasting may soon be feasible given 
the automation of event data collec- 
tion. Nonetheless, this remains a major 
problem. 
Even assuming automation 
reducess the time lag inherent in "late 
warning," significant problems re- 
main. First, areas in crisis are typically 
underreported in the standardinterna- 
t i 0 4  wire services that we all depend 
on for information. Journalists and 
governmental experts typically arrive 
on the scene after the events have be- 
come troublesome. Second, relevant 
information may be withheld from 
widespread distribution (such as on 
the Internet) and thus remain inacces- 
sible. Third, the existing automated 
systems are unable to contextualize 
critical information and thus make it 
relevant to policymakers. For example, 
in the PANDA system (with which one 
of the authors is associated), we may 
be able to accurately count the number 
and characteristics of wide-spread po- 
litical protests, but we cannot idenhfy 
the goals or specific meanings of these 
events, and thus we are unable to judge 
the extent to which they are likely to 
lead to a crisis. At this point, we need to 
integrate quantitative indicators with 
the expertise found in each country, 
thereby bringing expert methods to- 
gether with standard indicator ap- 
proaches. 
Contextual Sensitivity 
Learning of political events out of con- 
text leads to the second problem, 
contextual sensitivity. In the early 
warning literature there is an acknowl- 
edgement of the multi-leveled condi- 
tions that can produce humanitarian 
disasters. These are usually distin- 
guished as root (long-term) causes, 
proximate (medium-term) events, ac- 
celerating factors, triggering events, 
and intervening conditions. Typically 
these various conditions are treated as 
if they were mutually exclusive, but in 
fact, we suspect they are not. Clark 
(1989), for example, argues that in the 
early warning of refugee disasters, 
proximate events can also be interven- 
ing factors. Collective action among 
the population, for instance, could 
either a) lead to refugee out-migration 
through a threat to the government, 
which, in turn increases repression, or 
b) present an alternative to flight. The 
outcome of collective action depends 
on context, especially the availability 
of escape routes, the responsiveness of 
the regime, and so on. In quantitative 
modelling context sensitive measures 
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that capture this complexity must be 
devised. We recommend strongly that 
EW analysts begin considering meth- 
ods of contextual analysis widely used 
in the social sciences and adapt these to 
their purposes. This also points to the 
need to become knowledgeable about 
specific countries and cases, so that we 
can better understand how these com- 
plex contexts work. 
The Timing Problem 
A third problem is the timing of indica- 
tors. We may never resolve the issue of 
exact timing, since "each incident of 
forced migration has particular char- 
acteristics" (Gordenker 1992, 4). 
Long-term (or root) causes may occur 
years or even decades before the exo- 
dus, while medium-term (or proxi- 
mate) causes may occur only months 
still very little guidance in the 
literature as to how long it really takes 
for certain events to lead to humanitar- 
ian disasters. While it might be 
self-evident that genocide and war will 
lead to refugee migration, the tempo- 
ral structure of these developments 
can vary. In some cases, the outbreak 
of a war and/or genocide may directly 
correspond with the start of refugee 
movements; then again, it may take 
months, or longer for people to pick up 
and leave. Migratory movements also 
vary in accordance with different types 
of generalized violence. During civil 
wars, people have been known to 
refuse to leave despite intensive vio- 
lence (e.g. Peru); while elsewhere peo- 
ple turn to resistance and/or flight 
readily. What this suggests is that we 
need to experiment extensively with 
The muin problem with the unit of analysis is the uneven 
coverage of countries and regions, especially with the creation 
of new states and the increase in subnational or regional 
conflicts and disasters. 
before out-migration. Since the time 
point of the causes could be decades 
before the refugee movement occurs, it 
may be difficult to find indicators that 
fit into a model aimed at explaining 
refugee migration. 
Triggering events are the most diffi- 
cult to place. Theoretically, they would 
occur almost simultaneously with, or 
only days before, flight. In addition, 
most conventional methods in the so- 
cial sciences (including time-series 
analysis) are unable to evaluate the 
close timing associated with triggering 
events. Due to these problems, EWM 
researchers have shied away from 
more immediate causes, such as trig- 
gering events, and typically focused on 
root, proximate and accelerator fac- 
tors. However, it is important to point 
out that for policy purposes, triggering 
events are critical in preparing for 
emergency relief. 
In our own research on refugee early 
warning, we have experimented with 
several time lags, up to ten to fifteen 
years for some root causes. Yet there is 
varying time-lags and to incorporate 
an awareness of contextual variation 
into this temporal process. 
Availability of Data 
The largest problem of all is suitable 
and reliable data. Most of us are inten- 
sively involved in indicator construc- 
tion precisely because of the absence of 
suitable and reliable indicators of rel- 
evant processes. Such indicators need 
to provide both geographic and tem- 
poral coverage; otherwise we will not 
be able to generate useful assessments. 
However, important variables such as 
income inequality or land inequality 
are only available for a small number 
of countries and for a limited time pe- 
riod. Furthermore, sometimes re- 
gional information might be very 
important, which is even harder to find 
(we will discuss this 'unit of analysis' 
problem later). Thus, a researcher en- 
gaged in quantitative analysis is often 
compelled to ignore important factors 
(e.g., inequality) or important cases 
(e.g., the poorest countries) because of 
lack of information. Related to this is 
the problem of access (including secu- 
rity and proprietary data). Govern- 
ment agencies and transnational 
corporations often have relevant data, 
but are unwilling to share such sensi- 
tive information. 
Measurement Issues 
We often have to rely on very crude 
indicators for important events. For 
example, we may know whether or not 
there was a war or a genocide, but it 
may be more important to know the 
intensity of such a war or genocide 
when trying to predict a certain out- 
come such as refugee migration. Death 
estimates of such humanitarian disas- 
ters, however, are problematic. After 
all, mass graves in Bosnia and Rwanda 
are just now telling the tale of the ex- 
tent of genocides that took place few 
years ago and that have been a subject 
of dispute among several sources. 
Similarly, we may never know the ex- 
act number of people affected in a war. 
This information, often very crucial, is 
almost impossible to obtain. We do not 
know the number of deaths (let alone 
the toll of the injured), of houses 
burned or destroyed, of women raped. 
All this could aid us in assessing the 
intensity of a humanitarian crises, yet 
the information is unavailable, and we 
are forced to rely on very crude esti- 
mates. This discussion canbe extended 
to the amount of weaponry involved in 
a war or dispute, the number of people 
participating in conflict and protest, 
etc. All this information is often very 
sensitive and thus not readily avail- 
able; when available, its veracity is 
highly contested. 
These measurement problems 
greatly limit the type of EWMs that can 
be constructed. Schmeidl's (1995) 
analysis of the early warning of refu- 
gee migration illustrates this issue. 
Although she was able to predict refu- 
gee migration over a twenty year pe- 
riod (1971-1990) across 109 countries, 
she encountered several problems. 
First, there were many countries that 
did not follow the general pattern de- 
scribed in the model. Some countries 
expelled considerably more refugees 
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than expected and some countries less. 
This suggests that the major indicators 
were not sensitive enough to explain 
refugee migration. However, crude 
estimates of the intensity of wars and 
genocides (instead of a simple dichoto- 
mous variable of occurrence and 
non-occurrence) did not improve the 
results and, in some cases, produced 
inferior results. This may reflect poor 
quality estimates of the intensity of 
violence, but it may also reflect the dif- 
ficulty of linking violence to particular 
time periods. Thus, a simple dichoto- 
mous variable proved statistically 
more useful, despite the fact that sub- 
stantively it should be inferior. 
The Unit of Analysis 
The main problem with the unit of 
analysis is the uneven coverage of 
countries and regions, especially with 
the creation of new states and the in- 
crease in subnational or regional con- 
flicts and disasters. The breakup of the 
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 
and Ethiopia, along with the growth of 
regional conflicts, have created a need 
for a new level of analysis for which we 
are lacking (for the most part) suitable 
data. Cross-national scholars have fo- 
cused on developing national indica- 
tors but largely ignored sub-national 
differences. We are all aware of coun- 
tries with major regional or internal 
inequalities and differences but, aside 
from crude estimates (e.g., sectoral in- 
equality, ethnic differences) we have 
neglected these indicators. For the 
policymakers, however, such sub-na- 
tional measurement is becoming of in- 
creasing importance. 
Similarly, the most important indi- 
cators are often relational indicators, 
such as the relationships between dif- 
ferent groups and populations, yet 
these are barely explored. Gurr (1993) 
and associates have made an heroic 
effort to tackle this issue with ethnic 
minorities. This kind of research needs 
to be extended to other kinds of vul- 
nerable populations (e.g., women, 
children, the elderly, regional sub- 
groups) so that we can accurately 
gauge the populations at risk. 
Conclusion 
Despite our scepticism, our aimhasnot 
been to disavow the importance or the 
eventual promise of quantitative 
EWM. In fact, we are practitioners of 
the art as well as its champions. Our 
aim has been to identify the major ana- 
lytic problems that quantitative EW 
assessment currently confronts so as to 
promote a better understanding of the 
task ahead. In an ideal world, EWM 
will eventually be able offer: 1) a global 
reach in terms of the number of coun- 
tries and time periods concerned; 2) a 
comparison of positive as well as 
negative cases of the development of 
humanitarian disasters and their ma- 
jor determinants; and 3) the incorpora- 
tion of sub-national and regional 
information as well as relevant indica- 
tors of the risks of specific populations. 
Eventually, we will have a deeper un- 
derstanding of the causes of specific 
types of humanitarian disasters, their 
timing, and their contextual sources. 
Ultimately, we will be able to use the 
reactivity of human agency to our ad- 
vantage by providing timely informa- 
tion that can be used for policy purposes 
as well as academic analysis. 
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